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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we argue that the formulation of typical expert judgements –
here referred to as ‘judgement calls’ – entails ﬁguring out how to apply
‘general knowledge’ to speciﬁc circumstances (what we call the ‘relevance
query’). This requires wisdom, in its original Aristotelian sense, on the part of
the scientiﬁc expert, as knowledge of laws and initial conditions is not
suﬃcient to make judgement calls. Experts need to take into consideration
factors coming from ‘outside’ the remit of scientiﬁc theory, thereby crossing
the divide between empirical evidence and socio-political input (what we call
the ‘expert query’). Arguing against some form of the fact-value distinction is
far from an original move, but we will do so both by avoiding the conclusion
that expert judgements are nothing but political (against the received view in
the sociology of science), and by advocating a somewhat novel perspective.
We will claim that expert scientiﬁc knowledge proves to be inadequate when
it is not integratedwith local knowledge, whichwedeﬁne as the knowledge of
all factors, which are deemed relevant to the application of general knowl-
edge to speciﬁc circumstances. The possession and role of this type of
knowledge, though partly an empirical (or sociologically situated) question,
can be justiﬁed by epistemological reasons.
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Preliminaries
It is a short step from arguing that there is no sharp divide between science and politics to arguing
that so-called scientiﬁc experts do not have more truthful or objective knowledge of the world
than ordinary people. This step – taken by some sociologists of science for example – is, we believe,
unnecessarily radical or, indeed, too short.1 Instead, we claim that the old problem of epistemology
(when is a belief warranted or rationally justiﬁed?) is indispensable to understand the role and
nature of expert knowledge. As we will argue, a qualiﬁed epistemological analysis may well lead to
rejecting the distinction between science and society (so welcomed by the sociologists of science),
without going so far as to support the view that the content and purpose of science is nothing but
political (an unnecessary and, for us at least, unwelcome radical outcome).
In this essay, we will address the following two related questions concerning expertise (hereafter
the Expertise query):
– How does expert scientiﬁc knowledge prove sometimes inadequate as the sole adjudicator of
what course of action to undertake?
– How do diﬀerent types of knowledge, sometimes also ‘non-expert’, become necessary to
formulate a judgement call (i.e. a judgement in view of action)?
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Contemporary sociology of science addresses this query in the way outlined above. We argue
instead that this query could be considerably clariﬁed, and perhaps better met, by ﬁnding an
answer to the following typical question of knowledge transfer (hereafter, and for reasons that will
be made explicit later, the Relevance query):
- How can general knowledge apply to speciﬁc circumstances?
To ﬁnd an appropriate answer to this second query, we suggest making use of some tools from the
philosophy of science.2
In this essay, we will proceed as follows. In the ﬁrst section, we will start by addressing the
Relevance query. In the following section, with the help of some real-life examples, we will show how
a suitable understanding and formulation of the Relevance query could provide an answer to each of
the two questions that constitute the Expertise query. A trait that such understanding brings to the
fore is the crucial role played by local knowledge (in a meaning that will be speciﬁcally articulated) in
formulating judgements of epistemic relevance. Acknowledging such a trait can, convincingly we
believe, support an argument to the eﬀect that both scientiﬁc experts and ‘non-experts’ can be
considered knowledge carriers, and consequently also explain why both can and should combine or
share information.3 In some concluding remarks, we will emphasise how this argument is by its own
very nature epistemological. It is an argument that can indeed become instrumental in rejecting the
divide between the scientiﬁc/technical sphere and the political/social sphere, though for reasons
other than those advocated by the sociology of science, and with diﬀerent consequences.
The Relevance Query: General and Local Knowledge
It has been known since Aristotle that applying a general rule or norm to particular circumstances
requires a certain amount of wisdom.4 In Nicomachean Ethics wisdom is deﬁned as an essential
component of all practical judgements: ‘Nor is wisdom,’ Aristotle writes, ‘only concerned with
universals: to be wise, one must also be familiar with the particular, since wisdom has to do with
action, and the sphere of action is constituted by particulars’ (Aristotle 2002, 1141b15-17).
Nonetheless, the awareness that this is also the case when we apply natural laws to particular
cases can be hailed as an achievement of post-positivist philosophy of science. In order to see how
Aristotle’s problem is not so far removed from post-positivistic concerns, we need to take what at
ﬁrst sight might appear a little detour through the well-known and yet controversial terrain of the
function of laws in explanatory and predictive contexts.
In their simplest neopositivist formulation, scientiﬁc laws are universal empirical generalizations
which, together with a number of initial conditions, allow for the deduction of a description of
some phenomena. ‘Whenever a metallic bar is heated it increases in length,’ together with ‘object
a is a heated metal bar’ will lead us to deduce that object a (a metallic bar) will increase its length.5
Hempel expresses this in the following way:
The explanatory import of the whole argument lies in showing that the outcome described in the explanan-
dum was to be expected in view of the antecedent circumstances and the general laws listed in the explanans.
More precisely, the explanation may be constructed as an argument in which the explanandum is deduced
from the explanans. (Hempel 1965, 299)
Therefore, following the nomological instruction, the description of speciﬁc events (‘the bar will
lengthen’) is deduced from speciﬁc antecedent circumstances (this is a metal bar and it is heated).
In a nutshell, general laws allow us to claim, via deductive inferences, that ‘if the situation (i.e. initial
or antecedent conditions) is X, then Y will happen’.
All this is well known – as it is also that no laws, even the most successful ones, guarantee
a plain, straightforward deduction of phenomena when applied to speciﬁc circumstances. Let us go
back to our toy example of a scientiﬁc law: ‘Whenever a metallic bar is heated it increases in
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length’. To comply with standard neopositivism, we would say that the truth of the law, together
with the initial condition that a metallic bar has been actually heated, can alone provide suﬃcient
conditions for the aforementioned outcome. And yet, it is easy to show why this claim is far from
being correct. Suppose that a mischievous child hammers simultaneously the two extremities of
the metallic bar while it is being heated. In this case, the bar will not show the property of
increasing its length. Thus, we should conclude that (a) either the law or the initial condition is
false, or (b) a deductive inference is not adequate to oﬀer an explanation of the behaviour of the
heated bar, since the truth of the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the truth of the
premises. If we have reasons (and often there are good reasons) to rule out (a), we can only
question the adequacy of (b).
It would be wrong to think that this problem comes down to claiming that even the hard
sciences require a ‘ceteris paribus’ clause when natural laws are applied to particular circumstances
(namely, a clause to the eﬀect that, if nothing interferes, x will be the case). It was the late Hempel
who cast doubt on this apparently easy solution to the failures of deductivism. He pointed out that
‘the idea of a ceteris paribus clause is itself vague and elusive’ since it does not tell us ‘what other
things, and equal to what’ (Hempel 1988, 156–7). By using a ceteris paribus clause, we cannot ﬁx
deductive failures when in the presence of mischievous children. As Hempel further writes:
A [ceteris paribus clause] as here understood is not a clause that can be attached to a theory as a whole and
vouchsafe its deductive potency by asserting that in all particular situations to which the theory is applied,
disturbing factors are absent. Rather [the ceteris paribus clause] has to be conceived as a clause which pertains
to some particular application of the given theory and which asserts that in the case at hand, no eﬀective factors
are present other than those explicitly taken into account. (Ibid., p. 154, italics are ours)6
Therefore, to formulate a valid deductive argument we need to establish that in a given
application of the theory all relevant factors have been taken into account. We cannot simply
claim that, if no disturbing factors are present, then the truth of the theory warrants the deduction
of the phenomenon. A deductive model of explanation is not hypothetical reasoning: it must
explain why a phenomenon occurred ‘in the case at hand’. So, the problem raised by Hempel
against deductivism can quite simply be summarized as follows: ceteris paribus clauses ‘transcend’
the conceptual borderlines of a theory. After all, no scientiﬁc laws can take into account the
lamentable fantasy of a child!
On a contemporary scene, and further away from neopositivism, another prominent philosopher
of science came to a somewhat similar conclusion. Nancy Cartwright pictures the view of theories
based on the deductive power of laws by using the analogy with a ‘vending machine.’ We can
think of this type of theories as a machine being fed with some input (i.e. some prescribed forms/
principles/premises/etc.) with the view of expecting some desired output. The theory/machine
gurgitates for a while, and eventually spits out the sought-for representation, ‘plonk, on the tray,
fully formed, as Athena was from the brain of Zeus’ (Cartwright 1999, 184). Cartwright’s primary
concern regarding this way of representing theories speciﬁcally addresses the expectation of
universalism. Even when theories are ‘customised’ to meet the special needs of the case at hand
(e.g. by producing models that include improvements on the domain of applicability of the general
theory), they do not contain in advance all the resources needed to represent all possible cases
outside the remit of the domains where they work successfully. In her own words,
‘our best and most powerful deductive sciences seem to support only a very limited kind of closure: so long as
the only relevant factors at work are ones that can be appropriately modeled by the theory, the theory can
produce exact and precise predictions. [. . .] But this is a long distance from hope that all situations lend
themselves to exact and precise predictions.’7
This is why scientiﬁc laws must all be formulated with an at least implicit ceteris paribus clause –
a strong reminder against universalism, but also against the mechanical application of theory to
particular cases. ‘Producing a model of a new phenomenon like superconductivity is an incredibly
diﬃcult and creative activity.’ (Ibid. 184). It requires wisdom too, we can add, in the Aristotelian
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sense mentioned above. Creativity and wisdom are not something we associate with vending
machines. Theories, and the scientiﬁc laws they are built on, require to be ‘ﬁtted out’ (Ibid. 39) on
diﬀerent concrete occasions, and to achieve this ‘ﬁtting out’ we need to establish what relevant
factors make them applicable to the occasion under scrutiny.
This means at least two things. First, what we have just called ‘occasion’ is not the same as
a ‘particular’ that can be mechanically deduced from a premise plus initial conditions, so the ‘ﬁtting
out’ is not a task well-suited to a covering law. Secondly, the particular cases that a theory is meant
to handle often, or at least in principle, go beyond the predictive power inscribed in its laws.
Together, these two aspects bring us to the recognition that theoretical or nomological applic-
ability is a ‘bottom up’ relationship, consolidated by a series of facts, and by the contribution of
types of understanding, that are not necessarily included in the theory or laws whose applicability
is ultimately at stake. We call the understanding of the facts that allow for an applicability
relationship, to avoid confusion with some of the terminology of the received view, local
knowledge.
To anticipate the argument that comes next, scientiﬁc experts need to be Aristotelically ‘wise’
when applying their general knowledge (laws and theories) to local circumstances. It is not
suﬃcient for them to have good and well-established general knowledge. They also need local
knowledge, namely the knowledge of the speciﬁc relevant circumstances to which general knowl-
edge is applied. To reiterate, applicability requires a great deal of wisdom on the part of the expert,
because aﬃrming that all relevant factors have been thoroughly identiﬁed and included transcends
the experts’ ‘machinery’ (theories and laws).
So, local knowledge plays to some extent a diﬀerent role from a ceteris paribus clause. It is not
knowledge of facts to be kept at bay (so that a law is considered to be applicable to the domain
identiﬁed by the hypothetical exclusion of all disturbing factors) but, more positively, knowledge of
facts that speaks for relevance (so that a law or a theory proves its applicability ‘bottom up’). Local
knowledge is also diﬀerent from knowledge of particulars, as in the received view. It is not
knowledge that can be deduced from the premises of an explanatory/nomological argument. It
is knowledge that transcends deduction, and possibly comes from ‘other sources’.
The Role and Value of Local Knowledge: An Epistemic Answer to the Expert Query
Having addressed the Relevance query, how can we argue that it helps us in clarifying, and
purportedly ﬁnding an answer to, the Expert query?
Let us remind ourselves what the two-pronged Expert query consists of:
– How does expert scientiﬁc knowledge sometimes prove inadequate as the sole adjudicator of
what course of action to undertake?
– How do diﬀerent types of knowledge, sometimes also ‘non-expert’, become necessary to
formulate a judgement call (i.e. a judgement in view of action)?
Let’s ﬁrst reformulate the substance of the two questions in the terminology articulated by
means of the Relevance query. As to the ﬁrst prong, often experts rely only, or predominantly,
on what we have previously called ‘general knowledge,’ incorrectly assuming that this knowl-
edge is suﬃcient and adequate to guarantee a ‘vending machine’ result. As to the second
prong, in disputes that involve scientiﬁc experts, knowledge provided from outside the domain
of the expert often helps in adjusting their expertise to ‘the case at hand.’ In other words, using
the terminology previously introduced, ‘local knowledge’ comes from ‘other sources’. These
‘other sources’ are not necessarily included in the ‘vending machine’ input (and this is why they
are sometimes looked upon with suspicion), but might prove useful (namely, relevant) in
deciding ‘what to do’ in the circumstances.8
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Leaving aside for the moment how the diﬀerent sources of knowledge are to be combined to
form a discerning, reliable judgement call, let us focus on the two questions just reformulated, and
analyse them with the help of some concrete illustrations.
Our ﬁrst example goes back to 1960s Italy, to what is known (and tragically remembered by
earlier generations) as the ‘Vajont disaster’.9 As a consequence of having built the tallest (at the
time) arch dam in the world in an area where the fragility of the surrounding rocks was overlooked,
and worrying premonitory signs of imminent catastrophe ignored, an entire town was completely
wiped away by a gigantic wave of water (with peaks over 200 m) overﬂowing the dam. The
overﬂow was due to a massive landslide (260 million cubic metres over an area of 2 sq. km) falling
into the reservoir and, concomitantly, to the dam resisting the impact of the slide, causing the
water to ﬁll an entire valley in a matter of seconds.
How could things go so wrong? How could the several warnings of danger, well known and
repeatedly reported by the local community, well before the disaster, be overlooked? How could
the Adriatic Energy Corporation SADE,10 the company in charge of the project, not take the risk of
disaster more seriously? How could Carlo Semenza, the engineer who designed and chose the
location for the dam, act so recklessly? These are some of the questions that haunted public
opinion, the media and the Italian political scene for years to come after the disaster.
It is important to note that studies on the structural stability of the valley had been carried out
in advance of building the dam, but they were conﬁned to the abutment area and its hydraulic
properties (the only studies, it must be noted, required by law in those days). Nowadays it may
seem foolhardy to embark on a work of such magnitude without a preliminary and in-depth study
of the inner constitution and resistance of the slopes in the valley. Yet at the time, the formidable
engineering challenges of the project took precedence over the geological uncertainties of the
natural environment.
This choice was partly justiﬁed by the aforementioned lack of juridical norms, and partly by the
existence of well-supported knowledge of the nature and behaviour of the rocks typical of that
area (cf. Semenza 2005, 32 ﬀ.; Carloni 1995, 13ﬀ.). ‘From a geological point of view – Carlo Semenza
wrote – the rocks [of the Veneto region] are generally very good [. . .]. Overall, limestone is honest
because it reveals its ﬂaws on its surface’ (cited in Gervasoni 1968, 11). In-depth geological studies
were therefore considered unnecessary because the typical rocks of the area did not raise any
visible concern. The focus was: how to build a good dam, rather than: how to guarantee that the
surrounding natural environment would not interfere with the project. However, this was a fatal
mistake. Relying on general geological understanding of the behaviour of limestone was insuﬃ-
cient and inadequate, for reasons akin to those pointed out by the Relevance Query as addressed in
the previous section. Let’s see why.
No doubt, in order to pursue a project of such magnitude as the Vajont arch dam, the
community of experts needed sophisticated general knowledge about, for instance: the chemical
and physical characteristics of the rocks forming the terrestrial crust; the geological characteristics
of landslides and their behaviour (in particular, their compactness and fall speed); and technolo-
gical/hydraulic knowledge concerning the resistance of dams to water pressure. Semenza and his
fellow scientists had all or most of this well-established knowledge. However, at the same time,
some independent knowledge (not as well established) of facts regarding the speciﬁc surroundings
where the dam was being built had been gradually emerging: deep fractures, tremors and loud
noises coming from Mount Toc (the mountain behind the dam), a 50 million cubic meter slide in
a nearby artiﬁcial lake that killed one man, and mounting evidence that a much bigger, much older
landslide could have set itself in motion at any time. What Semenza failed to see was that (and
how) this latter knowledge could and would have contributed to demonstrate the real worth of
well established general knowledge (proof of eﬀectiveness) in the particular circumstances where it
was called upon.11
Possessing general chemical, physical, geological knowledge did not ipso facto entail relevant
information about the impact of a speciﬁc environment on the rocks in question, and about the
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particular reaction of these particular rocks to that impact (i.e. a potential non-linear behaviour of
limestone in the circumstances). In a word, the ﬁrst thing that was missing from Carlo Semenza’s
choice of action was awareness of the role of local knowledge. This is because Semenza intuitively
relied on a view of general knowledge to be fed into theories like vending machines (in the sense
outlined in the previous section). In other words, the reasoning: ‘if the situation is X, theory T will
tell us that Y happens’, applied to the case of the Vajont, becomes: ‘if the rock in the Vajont is
limestone (situation X), and the theories in our background knowledge about this rock tell us x,y,z
about limestone, then this very rock will behave in the way predicted by our background knowl-
edge (Y will happen)’. By reasoning this way Semenza overlooked the problem (epistemological) of
how to make general background knowledge ‘relevant’ to the speciﬁc context he was dealing with.
In other words, he overlooked the role that local facts play in informing the application of general
knowledge to speciﬁc circumstances.
Part of the reason for this neglect, we must now explain, is that some of this local knowledge
was held by local people (the inhabitants of the valley, peasants and mountaineers in the Vajont).
This knowledge was not ‘scientiﬁc’, it was not formalized in a textbook, nor was it discovered by
scientiﬁc method and expressed in sophisticated geological classiﬁcations. Nonetheless, it could
count as knowledge. In fact, the mountaineers’ system of beliefs was warranted by a secular and
detailed acquaintance with the slopes of the valley. However, at least partly because it was a type
of knowledge formulated in such a way that did not command assent and credibility, the overall
role of local knowledge in building relevance to ‘the case at hand’ was by and large overlooked.
This was a mistake. As the Relevance query teaches us, applying the general to the particular is not
an automatic, deductive trick played by theories – even the best-established among them.
The contested acknowledgement of the role of local knowledge in framing expert judgements
emerges from the analysis of another case study, where what is at stake is the formulation of policy
predictions. We move from twentieth century Italy to contemporary United Kingdom, where an on-
going dispute is taking place on whether culling badgers is the best measure to contain the spread of
bovine tuberculosis.12 Scientiﬁc experts (diﬀerent groups of scientists/advisors to the UK government
since the 1970s) have long established that badgers are a signiﬁcant cause of the spread of the disease
(a ten-year ‘Randomised Badger Control Trial’ set the level of statistical signiﬁcance at 40% in certain
areas of the Southeast of Great Britain). Yet, scientists disagree on the measures to recommend in order
to reduce the spread. The reason for disagreement is interesting because once more it involves the
crucial issue raised by the Relevance Query. If we compare the two major scientiﬁc reports on the
scientiﬁc evidence in the badger story (Bourne et al., 2007; King et al., 2007) we immediately realize why.
To the question ‘would culling badgers eﬃciently slow down the progress of TB in cattle?’ the
Bourne et al. report gives a negative answer. The evidence presented in this report is not only
based on the well-established ﬁndings of the RBCT. Given the complex nature of the problem, we
are told, evidence should be combined from diﬀerent sources (Bourne et al. 2007: 32): besides
a ﬁrm grounding in genetic, epidemiological, ecological and environmental studies, also input from
economic, social, practical (such as the technologies of disease management) and animal welfare
arguments (partly also receptive of people’s dispositions towards valuing the preservation of the
countryside) are deemed critical in assessing the eﬀectiveness of culling as a measure of TB control.
To the same question, the King et al. report gives a positive answer, based entirely on the results of
the RBCT. Here it is explicitly argued that the answer to the question above was formulated by
focusing exclusively on the scientiﬁc basis (King et al. 2007, 3) and – following government brief –
by separating out ‘economic or other practical issues.’13
However, we can ask, could such issues easily be kept at bay? Could they be severed from
a policy prediction formulated on the basis of scientiﬁc evidence? Do they just belong in the realm
of ‘practicalities’? We are somehow back to the problem posed earlier by the ceteris paribus clause.
To see why let us ﬁrst reformulate the type of reasoning from which the divide between Bourne
and King supposedly takes shape.
The reasoning reads as follows:
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Given that X (badgers) are a signiﬁcant cause of infection, then Y (culling badgers) might help
contain the spread of the disease – provided that x, y, z won’t impede eﬀective culling (ceteris
paribus clause).
For King the proviso can be set aside in the argument for the credibility of the link
between X and Y (from cause to prediction). In the Bourne et al. scenario, instead, the facts
or factors included in the proviso are precisely what allows for the transition from X to Y: they
are relevant to make Y follow from X. Or, to use our earlier terminology, the knowledge of the
facts included in the proviso should not so much help us keep certain facts at bay, but rather
increase the acceptability of expert judgement – that is, in this case, correctly predicting
a particular causal link. Predicting the eﬀectiveness and sustainability of culling badgers by
the farming industry is indeed a matter of judgement, besides being a matter of science.14
What enters this judgement is a whole range of practical questions that includes economic
considerations, the feasibility of certain technologies of management, the practical imple-
mentation of certain courses of action, as well as values, ideologies, and common sense
views.15 The costs of eradication programmes versus available resources vs. beneﬁts in terms
of some public interest, cattle’s welfare against badgers’ protection, the impact on the
farming community and their rights vs. animal rights groups ﬁghting for animals’ interests
(be they badgers or cows): these diﬀerent types of information cannot be simplistically
blanketed under the term ‘practicalities’.
N. Cartwright uses the expression ‘supportive factors’ to refer to that variegated team of
local conditions that in speciﬁc circumstances help us achieve applicability of general knowl-
edge (Cartwright and Hardie 2012, 25). For example, in the case we are discussing, if we intend
to ensure eﬀective shooting of badgers a minimum distance from badger setts should be
respected. However, what counts as ‘minimum distance’ depends on individual sets of badgers,
and on badger activity within diﬀerent sets, etc. Even when measurable eﬀective shooting in
one or more setts is achieved, this does not secure an overall result in terms of eﬀective
containment of the disease, since yet other factors might (and do normally) enter the picture to
upset the expected general outcome. Finally, it goes without saying that for those who deny
the appropriateness of shooting badgers altogether (e.g. on ethical grounds, or on general
environmental predilections) diﬀerent local factors will enter the domain of pertinent local
knowledge – which further demonstrates how the appreciation of local knowledge goes well
beyond what an ideal manual for the good use of scientiﬁc knowledge can predict and lead us
to expect.
Both our examples oﬀer, we believe, an appropriate illustration of how to answer the Expertise
query sketched at the beginning of this section by making use of the role we established for local
knowledge via the Relevance query. First, expert scientiﬁc knowledge is not suﬃcient to adjudicate
predictively the consequences of adopting that knowledge in contexts of use. Both in the Vajont
and the badger cases the role of local knowledge is crucial in securing a correct – more speciﬁcally,
‘relevant’ – use of expert knowledge in practical circumstances. Good scientiﬁc knowledge of the
behaviour of limestone, and even more so, knowledge of the behaviour of badgers, needs to be
situated in contexts relevant to what that knowledge is asked to support, or adjudicate. Secondly,
adjusting expertise to ‘the case at hand’ requires knowledge provided from outside the strict
domain of scientiﬁc expertise. Knowledge made available by diﬀerent types of local communities
(the inhabitants of the Vajont valley, animalist groups, farmers’ supporters, public opinion) should
not be dismissed hastily just because it has been formulated in terms other than those acknowl-
edged by scientiﬁc discourse and methodology. Complex social disputes require the contribution
of diﬀerent stakeholders, for reasons that are not only political or sociological. We believe that
addressing the Relevance query helps to identify the underlying epistemological reasons that
support and justify the requirement of joint contribution, while prompting the creation of condi-
tions for making collaborative exchange of knowledge happen in practice. To this we will turn in
some concluding remarks.
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Conclusions
Scientiﬁc experts must be wise. No doubt, they must have thorough expertise grounded on the
most reliable general knowledge. However, when applying general knowledge to speciﬁc
circumstances, on concrete occasions, they also need knowledge of all factors that are deemed
to be relevant to those occasions. As we have argued, general knowledge alone does not allow
for the prediction and explanation of phenomena. Accordingly, the expert must go beyond
general knowledge to make appropriate judgement calls, that is those judgements, which
provide ground for action. It is not just a matter of well-established ‘initial conditions’ (i.e. in
the terminology of the deductivist models of explanation, it is not suﬃcient for the antecedents
of a theory or law to be true in the given circumstances). The expert also needs to take into
consideration factors coming from ‘outside’ the remit of a theory, namely all those types of
factors that are not included in the laws and initial conditions, and which are still relevant to the
application of general knowledge to concrete occasions. This is where wisdom comes to the
fore. As Aristotle noticed, knowledge of general rules (i.e. in the ﬁeld of science, theories and
laws) is diﬀerent from the knowledge of their application to speciﬁc cases. The application
moment is not and cannot be governed by other general rules. The application moment is
a matter of judgement on the part of the expert.
In our analysis of the Relevance query we called the knowledge of the type of factors just
mentioned local knowledge. The concept and role of local knowledge as emerged from our
discussion of the Relevance query allowed us to formulate an answer to the two issues raised by
the Expert query. More speciﬁcally, local knowledge provides us with an answer to the ﬁrst prong of
the Expert Query (“How does expert scientiﬁc knowledge sometimes prove inadequate as the sole
adjudicator of what course of action to undertake?) in the following, simple terms: expert scientiﬁc
knowledge proves to be inadequate when scientiﬁc knowledge is equated to general knowledge
and is not integrated with local knowledge.
Local knowledge also provides an answer to the second prong of the Expert Query (‘How do
diﬀerent types of knowledge, sometimes also “non-expert”, become necessary to formulate
a judgement call?’), though in a slightly more elaborate form. More is needed here than
a logical or conceptual analysis. Nothing in principle prevents the experts from acquiring local
knowledge, and if they acquired it, they would not need ‘non-expert’ knowledge. This is where
conceptual analysis takes an empirical connotation. There are cases, such as in the badger story,
where so-called ‘practicalities’ can, in a more or less direct way, make it to the list of factors
included by the experts (as in Bourne et al. in analysis of evidence). There are other cases, such
as the Vajont, where such inclusion proves more diﬃcult. These are cases where local knowl-
edge is not of a kind that is recognized by oﬃcial science (it is provided by laypeople), though
being endowed with highly specialized expertise.16 Ultimately, both examples make us reﬂect on
a further but central aspect.
Relevance judgements are related to the social and moral values upheld by laypeople, and to
the interests and wellbeing of diﬀerent stakeholders. This further shows why, when making
a judgement call, the expert acts in a context that goes well beyond the mere application of
general knowledge. So, our overall answer to the Expert query from the perspective raised by the
Relevance query takes the following form: general knowledge can apply to speciﬁc circumstances
when experts possess local knowledge, namely the knowledge of all factors which are relevant to
the application of general knowledge to speciﬁc circumstances. The possession of this knowledge,
though partly an empirical question, is informed by epistemological reasons.
One ﬁnal point brings us back to the comment made right at the beginning of this essay. By
addressing the Expert query from within the framework of the Relevance query, we have singled out
what we take to be pertinent epistemological reasons for overcoming the divide between the
technical/scientiﬁc sphere and the social/political sphere without, at the same time, renouncing
a qualiﬁed concept of expertise. We have indeed shown that such a divide does not hold, since
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local knowledge coming from ‘other sources’ (e.g. society) is often necessary to ﬁll the gap
between experts’ knowledge and correct judgement calls. Notwithstanding this result, and contrary
to much contemporary sociology of science, this does not lead us to delegitimize the very concept
of scientiﬁc expertise.
Notes
1. It is interesting to note that even some sociologists of science have begun to distance themselves from the
corrosive scepticism of much sociology of science, which tends to delegitimize the very notion of scientiﬁc
expert. See for instance Collins and Evans (2002, 2017). However, Collins and Evans continue to support the
irrelevance of epistemological studies – a view from which we diﬀer.
2. Obviously, we do not purport to make a ‘neutral’ use of philosophy-of-science tools. These will be inevitably
adapted to carry out the analysis of the queries we focus on in this article. Furthermore, we will avoid any
excessive use of technical/analytic details. The task we set ourselves here is to bring in enough reasoned
evidence to show that epistemology is not as ‘boring’ (read ‘useless’) as Bruno Latour repeatedly argued (see,
for instance, Latour 2005). Nothing in the following denies the importance of sociological categories when
reﬂecting on of the role and function of experts in societies. Equally, we believe that epistemological
categories provide for relevant and speciﬁc tools of analysis.
3. The idea hinted at by this type of cooperation (i.e. the institution of a single community of inquirers) is
developed more in detail in Barrotta (2018).
4. Cf. Aristotle (2002) 1104a5-10, p. 112: ‘But if one says universally it is like this, what one says about particulars is
even more lacking in precision; for it does not fall either under any expertise or under any set of rules – the
agents themselves have to consider the circumstances relating to the occasion, just as happens in the cases of
medicine, too, and of navigation’.
5. We here stick by a deliberately simpliﬁed picture. We do not distinguish between causal and coexistence laws.
We do not mention the material condition for proper explanation. We do not bring in the controversial
“correspondence rules’, which connect theoretical terms with an observational language. Though important,
none of these issues is directly relevant to the problem we are trying to articulate.
6. Hempel’s view raised wide discussion. See, for instance, Coﬀa (1973), Giere (1988), Lange (1993), Lipton (1999),
Pietrowski and Rey (1995), Schiﬀer (1991).
7. Cartwright (1999), p.188.
8. It might here be appropriate to reiterate the thrust of our argument: local knowledge, in the sense speciﬁed in
this paper, becomes essential as soon as scientiﬁc results – as established by laboratory science – are
transferred outside the laboratory and applied over and beyond the strictly controlled environment of the
laboratory itself. As argued above, we are interested in the role of ceteris paribus clauses 1) in so much as the
local factors they bring to bear on the applicability of general knowledge ‘transcend’ the realm of what
a theory, a law, or an experiment are able to point at, and 2) as long as they prove to be factors not to be kept
at bay, but rather to be included in what counts (in some circumstances) as relevant knowledge. We thank an
anonymous referee for raising the question about local knowledge and laboratory science.
9. For a more detailed historical reconstruction, see Barrotta and Montuschi (2018).
10. This is the acronym from the Italian name of the corporation, i.e. ‘Società Adriatica di Elettricità’.
11. Better, Semenza only started considering the relationship between the two types of knowledge too late, and
the very connection was not approached with the attention and competence it deserved.
12. For a more detailed reconstruction of this case study see Montuschi (2017).
13. As for example emphasized in Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs Committee, v. 2, 2008, p. 101.
14. We are echoing here a 2011 government policy document on the badger question, where we read that
eﬀectiveness of culling is to be considered ‘a matter of judgement, not of science’ (Defra 2011, 11).
15. For example it has been pointed out how in the dispute over badgers diﬀerent images of, and feelings for,
these animals play a rather important role in the way issues are framed by opposite sides. The image of
a ‘rogue badger’ portrays a bad, deviant and antisocial creature, ‘senile and virtually toothless (. . .), whose
actions could be presented as a basis for intervention against a cherished animal’ (Grant 2009). This image is in
striking contrast with the sympathetic, favorable image adopted instead by animal protection groups, or by
a large part of public opinion. See on this Montuschi (2017, 73).
16. This is why we have always been careful to use inverted commas when referring to ‘non-experts’.
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